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Selection of climate policies under the
uncertainties in the Fifth Assessment
Report of the IPCC
L. Drouet1,2*, V. Bosetti1,2,3 and M. Tavoni1,2,4
Strategies for dealing with climate change must incorporate
and quantify all the relevant uncertainties, and be designed to
manage the resulting risks1. Here we employ the best available
knowledge so far, summarized by the three working groups
of the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC AR5; refs 2–4), to quantify
the uncertainty of mitigation costs, climate change dynamics,
and economic damage for alternative carbon budgets. We
rank climate policies according to dierent decision-making
criteria concerning uncertainty, risk aversion and intertem-
poral preferences. Our findings show that preferences over
uncertainties are as important as the choice of the widely
discussed time discount factor. Climate policies consistent
with limiting warming to 2 ◦C above preindustrial levels are
compatible with a subset of decision-making criteria and some
model parametrizations, but not with the commonly adopted
expected utility framework.
Many of the uncertainties surrounding climate change are
difficult to quantify and depend on the judgement of experts and
on the type of model used to generate future scenarios. Each
model produces a distribution over the possible states of nature
(for example, cost of mitigation, temperature increase, or economic
damage from climate change), and these distributions might differ
from model to model. How should we select climate policy in the
face of these uncertainties?
This paper addresses this question using a framework that
accounts for both state uncertainty (for example, the distribution
over states of nature) and model uncertainty (for example, the
different models (or experts) which generate distributions over
states)5. We investigate a variety of preferences and assumptions
over these two types of uncertainty. A special case is the subjective
expected utility6 framework, traditionally used in economic
evaluations. However, an expected utility setting might not work
when the information is incomplete and ambiguous, which is
clearly the case for climate change7. Moreover, people are known to
approach risks and uncertainties differently8. The proposed setting
allows us to explore additional decision-making criteria to deal with
uncertainty, in the spirit of refs 7,9. Alternative statistical techniques,
consistent with Bayesian approaches, have been developed to cope
with model uncertainty10. Model weighting is an active topic in
climate research11, where historical observations provide a basis for
model evaluation, although it is not commonly used12. Although
our framework is sufficiently flexible to accommodate different
prior probability measure over the set of possible models, our
baseline model assumes a uniform prior with equal model weights.
The literature on the role of uncertainty in climate policy
making has mostly relied on either analytical or simplified
integrated assessment models (IAMs), such as DICE (ref. 13). In
such contexts, different decision-making criteria and preferences
over risks have been shown to have a significant impact on
the optimal abatement strategy14,15. However, these exercises lack
detail in the representation of the mitigation options and the
climate dynamics. Larger-scale models, which capture the main
interrelationships between human and natural systems, have
incorporated uncertainty only partially owing to computational
limitations. Therefore, uncertainty is mostly treated by means of
multi-model ensembles16,17, or by single models performing Monte
Carlo simulations18,19. When accounting for all the key sources of
uncertainty, the selection of optimal climate policy has been shown
to be more sensitive to uncertainty about mitigation costs and
impacts than to uncertainty about warming20.
Figure 1 illustrates our approach. Using the best available
knowledge from the three working groups of IPCC AR5 (see
Methods), for each component (mitigation costs, temperature and
climate damage) we generate probability estimates for different
classes of models. The decision variable is the carbon budget—
that is, the cumulative CO2 emissions over the twenty-first century
(2010–2100). Carbon budgets are robust policy indicators, as they
are strictly related to global warming21 and climate targets22. We
assume that uncertainty resolves immediately, but show that our
results are robust to different timings of resolution of uncertainty
(in Supplementary Fig. 12).
We extract emission projections and associated mitigation costs
from the AR5 WGIII Scenario database4, which includes the
outcomes of many long-term scenarios produced by the most
well-established IAMs. The database spans a wide range of policy
stringency, and thus of associated carbon budgets, covering the
whole range of the representative concentration pathways. The
relationship between mitigation costs, harmonized across different
metrics, and carbon budgets is found to be nonlinear and highly
uncertain (Supplementary Fig. 2). Furthermore, the uncertainty
of mitigation costs increases with time (Supplementary Fig. 3).
From Supplementary Fig. 2 emerges a well-documented4 distinction
between different classes of IAMs: top-down (TD) models provide
a more accurate description of the economy, whereas bottom-up
(BU) models better represent the set of mitigation technologies. TD
models generally show higher mitigation costs than BUmodels, but
it is not obvious which class is the most reliable. We account for this
model type uncertainty by estimating different probabilistic models
of the evolution of mitigation costs.
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Figure 1 | Diagram illustrating the methodology. Greenhouse gas emission scenarios and mitigation costs are extracted from the dataset used byWorking
Group III (WGIII) of AR5. Temperature projections are computed from the fifth phase of the Coupled Model Inter-comparison Project (CMIP5) runs of the
working group I (WGI) outcomes. Global economic impacts are generated on the basis of the impact reviews proposed in the Fifth Assessment Report,
working group II (WGII). Finally, carbon budgets are selected from a set of decision rules and preferences. For more details, refer to Methods.
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Figure 2 | Influence of carbon budgets, model and state uncertainties on the distribution of the gross world product (GWP) per capita in 2100. The GWP
per capita, net of mitigation and damage costs, is expressed relative to its 2010 level. Results are provided for two illustrative and well-distanced CO2
carbon budgets (cumulative emissions over the period 2010–2100 of 1,000 and 5,000 GtCO2). The distribution means are indicated by a red line, and
99% percentile ranges in blue shades. HI and LO stand for high and low resolution, respectively.
The second step is to generate probabilistic temperature
projections for each emission scenario. The projections are
generated by a probabilistic climate model based on a reduced
complexity climate model23 calibrated to emulate the temperature
projections from the fifth phase of the Coupled Model Inter-
comparison Project (CMIP5; ref. 24). In addition to the whole set of
CMIP5 data set, we distinguish two classes of climate models—high
and low resolution in themodelling of ocean dynamics—which give
significant difference in temperature projection at the end of the
twenty-first century (see Supplementary Figs 5 and 6). This allows
us to account for climate-model uncertainty.
Finally, we link temperature increases to global economic impact
using data reported in the AR5 WGII (ref. 3). These estimates
do not include all the potential damage from climate change25,26,
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Figure 3 | Selected carbon budgets according to three decision-making criteria: relative risk aversion, consumption smoothing and pure rate of time
preference. The shaded area represents the carbon budget range compatible with a radiative forcing of 2.6Wm−2, according to Table SPM.3 of the IPCC
AR5 fromWGI (ref. 2). The Representative Concentration Pathway 2.6 carbon budget (RCP2.6) is also shown. The vertical bars represent the estimates of
the standard errors using bootstrapping. EIS stands for elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Decision rules are subjective expected utility (SEU), maxmin
expected utility (MAXMIN EU) and maxmin (MAXMIN). The legend in a applies to all panels.
but represent the best available knowledge at present and have
been used for calculating the social cost of carbon27. Given the
weak theoretical and empirical consensus on the functional form
of the relationship between temperature increase and damage, and
the few estimates available, especially for temperatures above 3 ◦C,
we capture model uncertainty by calibrating three damage models
of the impact distributions. In addition to the commonly used
quadratic specification, we also consider exponential and sextic
impact functions (Supplementary Fig. 7).
Each carbon budget can be associated with time-dependent
distributions of payoffs (Fig. 2). In the case of a very stringent carbon
budget (left panel), climate damage is kept under reasonable control,
and both the damage function and the climate resolution model
have a negligible impact on the gross world product (GWP). Rather,
it is the uncertainty in mitigation costs that has a sizeable impact on
the mean, whereas the tails are affected by the choice of the damage
model. The right-hand panel presents the results of a significantly
higher carbon budget. In this case, model uncertainty regarding
damage has huge implications on both themean and the tails. As this
higher budget is consistent with very low mitigation effort, neither
model uncertainty nor state uncertainty related to mitigation costs
have any significant influence. Climate-model uncertainty seems
to play a lesser role, despite its significant impact on late-century
temperature increase. Figure 2 also shows how the quadratic damage
model, typically employed in most cost-benefit analyses of climate
policy13, fails entirely in capturing significant fat-tailed impact
events, even when considering the uncertainty in climate response.
Given the distributions associated with different carbon budgets,
to select climate policies, we use a flexible utility function which
allows us to disentangle preferences over time, consumption
smoothing, and risk. We specify three decision criteria. The first
two criteria are built on the ‘classical subjective expected utility’
framework5. The subjective expected utility criterion (SEU) takes
expectations over states of nature and over models (each considered
equally likely). The maxmin expected utility criterion (Maxmin
EU) combines the expected utility with the maxmin criterion28,
effectively distinguishing between model and state uncertainty. The
carbon budget is selected on the basis of the expected payoff of the
most pessimistic model. Finally, we consider themaxmin criterion28
in which the decision makers focus on the worst consumption per
capita over both world states and models. Additional frameworks
have been proposed, but the aforementioned ones are among the
best known and provide useful benchmarks7.
The selected carbon budgets for the three different decision
criteria, as well as for preferences over time, intertemporal
substitution and risk, are reported in Fig. 3. Results confirm the
relationship between time preference and climate policy—namely,
that higher discounting of future payoffs leads to higher CO2
budgets. A similar dynamics occurs with respect to the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution (EIS), which measures the propensity to
smooth consumption over time from future (richer) generations to
current (poorer) generations.
The figure also allows us to quantify the role of preferences over
model and state uncertainties. Aversion against model uncertainty
(shown by the comparison between SEU and Maxmin EU) leads to
significantly more stringent climate policies. Ambiguity about the
damage function is the most important driver of model uncertainty,
reflecting its highly unknown nature (Supplementary Table 4).
Aversion against state uncertainty has an ambiguous impact on
climate policy: when the budgets are relatively high (for example,
because of high discounting or low EIS), higher risk aversion leads
to more stringent carbon budgets, to avoid high climate-change
damage. The opposite happens at low budgets, owing to the risks
of high mitigation costs. Quantitatively, the impact of risk aversion
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is relatively modest. Finally, maxmin constitutes a limiting case of
the maxmin EU: as the focus is exclusively on avoiding the worst
outcomes, maxmin never leads to lenient climate policies but it also
avoids very stringent ones.
From a policy perspective, the impact of the choice of the
decision-making criterion is shown to be as large as that of time
discounting and consumption smoothing. The carbon budget across
the decision criteria differs from 500 to almost 2,000GtCO2, amajor
variation in climate policy stringency.Using the central estimates for
the temperature climate response to emissions2, this translates into
a difference in warming of 0.25 to 1 ◦C. Carbon budgets compatible
with a radiative forcing of 2.6Wm−2—which is associated with
the 2 ◦C target—are selected with some specifications; however,
2 ◦C seems to never be optimal under the SEU criterion, which is
the one employed in the vast majority of cost-benefit analyses of
climate change.
Combining the vast amount of data and information collected
in the AR5 with the recent advances in decision theory allows us
to quantify the key uncertainties associated with climate change
and to propose a methodology for selecting global climate policies
under different preference structures.We show that aversion to both
model and state uncertainty has a major impact on the selection of
policies, as a result of the scarcity of knowledge that is still prevalent
in the literature on economic assessments of climate change29.
Uncertainties reported in the AR5 are likely to be lower bounds for
actual uncertainties, and are known to increase when moving from
global scales to local scales30. This might suggest that additional
precautions should be taken in devising our collective preferences.
Our results point to the need for additional research to understand
and better quantify a wider set of climate-change impacts. Similarly,
estimates of mitigation costs are still very imprecise, and in many
instances fail to include important economic feedback as well as
ancillary benefits. Moreover, learning about uncertainties might
yield insights on the dynamics of abatement.
So far, uncertainty has exacerbated the polarization in the public
debate over climate policies. On the one hand, uncertainty has been
interpreted as a reason for limited action on climate, whereas on
the other hand, it has been used as a precautionary argument in
favour of stringent mitigation. This paper provides one of the few
comprehensive approaches to uncertainty quantification in climate
change. By helping decision makers to see how their preferences
translate into climate policy recommendations, frameworks such as
ours can help improve the assessment of climate-change strategies.
Methods
Methods and any associated references are available in the online
version of the paper.
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Methods
We propose a method for selecting climate policies which accounts for different
preferences for risk, ambiguity and time. We adopt a two-stage subjective expected
utility framework5 that accounts for both state and model uncertainty. In the
context of this paper, ‘model uncertainty’ refers to the existence of alternative
modelling paradigms relating how mitigation costs, the dynamics of the climate
system, or economic damage resulting from climate change might respond to
climate policies; whereas ‘state uncertainty’ refers to the probabilistic response
(of mitigation costs, temperature, or climate damage) that each of these models
produces given a climate policy.
Integrated assessment model data set. The data set is issued from the AR5
scenario database, which has been created for the Integrated Assessment Modeling
Consortium (IAMC) and is hosted and maintained by the International Institute
for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). This database is publicly available and
contains outcomes from several model comparison projects, reviewed in the Fifth
Assessment Report (AR5) of Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC). The full description of the database is available in the
dedicated website (https://secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/AR5DB) and in
Section A.II.10 of the IPCC AR5.
The meta-analysis is carried out with a subset of the AR5 scenario database. We
select those long-term scenario-model outcomes that meet the following criteria:
model time horizon goes up to the year 2100; mitigation cost estimates are
provided; carbon dioxide CO2, methane CH4 and nitrous oxide N2O emissions are
provided; climate policy category is ‘baseline’, ‘reference’, or ‘first best’. ‘Baseline’
scenarios imply no climate policy after 2010, ‘reference’ scenarios implement a
weak policy and current pledges, and ‘first best’ scenarios have an efficient carbon
policy with an immediate target adoption. This leaves us with outcomes from eight
integrated assessment models and six model inter-comparisons projects: the Asian
Modeling Exercise (AME; ref. 31), the Assessment of Climate Change Mitigation
Pathways and Evaluation of the Robustness of Mitigation Cost Estimates
(AMPERE) project32, the Energy Modeling Forum’s Climate Change Control
Scenarios (EMF-22) and Global Model Comparison Exercise (EMF-27; ref. 17), the
Low climate IMpact scenarios and the Implications of required Tight emissions
control Strategies (LIMITS) project16 and the Roadmaps towards Sustainable
Energy futures (ROSE) project33. For each scenario we extract the global emission
pathway and the mitigation costs over the century.
Carbon budget. A carbon budget is defined as the cumulative total CO2 emissions
over the period 2010–2100. For each scenario, we sum up the world emissions of
CO2 from fossil-fuel combustion and industry, and from land-use change. As the
database provides the annual emissions every ten years from 2010 to 2100, the
intermediary annual emissions are linearly interpolated (see Supplementary Fig. 1
for an overview of the emission pathways and the carbon budgets from the selected
data set).
Mitigation costs. Each scenario is associated with information on mitigation costs.
‘Baseline’ scenarios have zero mitigation costs. Owing to the different nature of the
models, mitigation costs are expressed in three different, but comparable, cost
metrics: gross world product (GWP) losses, area under the marginal abatement
cost curve, and additional total energy system cost. These costs are converted in %
GWP change from baseline scenario. Supplementary Fig. 2 reports, for each
scenario-model outcome, two dimensions: carbon budget and mitigation costs.
Carbon budgets are negatively correlated with mitigation costs, in a nonlinear way.
Model categorization is based on a well-documented distinction34 between two
classes of integrated assessment models: top-down (TD) models, which provide a
more accurate description of the macroeconomic feedback, versus bottom-up (BU)
models, which better represent the set of mitigation technologies. For the purpose
of mitigation costs, TD models generally show higher costs than BU models, but it
is not obvious which class of models should be considered as the
most accurate.
On the basis of this data, we estimate three piecewise probabilistic models
relating, at each time period, carbon budgets and mitigation costs. The procedure,
described in the subsequent paragraph, is the same for the three estimated models;
what changes are the mitigation cost data used: data coming only from TD models,
data coming only from BU models, and the whole data set. First, mitigation costs
are clustered in five groups spanning the range of carbon budgets. We fit each
cluster data with a Weibull distribution. Second, we estimate, by means of least
squares, a relationship between the Weibull distribution parameters and the
budgets (the central budget of each cluster is taken as a reference in the fitting). In
all cases, each scenario-model outcome is weighted equally. Supplementary Fig. 3
presents the resulting piecewise probabilistic mitigation cost function for the case
of the whole data set.
Probabilistic temperature.We use an updated version of a climate model of
reduced complexity23 to emulate the CMIP5 model ensemble response. This model
version is composed of a climate module DOECLIM (ref. 35) and a carbon-cycle
model which includes feedbacks from the atmospheric CO2 concentration and
temperature36. Key geophysical model parameters are estimated from the CMIP5
temperature projections from 2010 to 2100 using a Bayesian inversion technique
based on the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm. The estimated
climate parameters are the climate sensitivity, the heat vertical diffusivity in the
ocean, and the aerosol scaling factor to the total radiative forcing. The carbon-cycle
estimated parameters are the carbon fertilization from living plants, the respiration
sensitivity related to temperature, and the thermocline carbon transfer rate in the
ocean. In addition, initial conditions of atmospheric temperature and CO2
concentration are also estimated.
To perform the MCMC, we constrain the model with the temperature
projections for the four Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP2.6, RCP4.5,
RCP6.0 and RCP8.5) provided by 38 climate models in the CMIP5 data set to
constrain the model. We retain 5,000 equally distant combinations of parameters
out of the 3,000,000 in the MCMC to avoid cross-correlation between them. The
emulator is able to reproduce the spread of the temperature projections from the
CMIP5 data set for the four RCPs (see Supplementary Fig. 4).
It is difficult to distinguish different classes of models from the CMIP5
ensemble as ‘there is high confidence that the model performance for global mean
surface air temperature (TAS) is high’, where the level of confidence is a
combination of the level of evidence and the degree of agreement (section on
model evaluation in Chapter 9 of the AR5 WGI; ref. 2). Our choice is to split the
model outcomes into two classes according to the extent of ocean resolution of the
climate model (more or less than 50,000 horizontal grid points). For the RCP4.5
and RCP 6.0, the CMIP5 model provides good agreement, whereas for the more
extreme scenario RCP2.6 and RCP8.5, the two classes of models diverge slightly
after 2070. In these cases, the high-resolution models have a colder atmosphere
than the low-resolution models (see Supplementary Fig. 5). Applying the
two-sample Welch’s t-test37 on the two subsets of the data, the difference in yearly
mean becomes highly significant after 2070 for the RCP2.6 and RCP8.5
(Supplementary Fig. 6).
Once calibrated, the emulator computes probabilistic temperature projections
associated with each scenario-model outcome, given information on carbon
dioxide emissions, and radiative forcing of other greenhouse gases and of aerosols.
The radiative forcing for the non-CO2 greenhouse gases is taken from the database,
when available, otherwise it is estimated from the emission levels and their
accumulation in the atmosphere. Similarly, the radiative forcing from aerosols is
taken from the data set, when available, otherwise it is inferred from the RCP
database (available at http://www.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/tnt/RcpDb). Three sets of
projections are produced, one for each of the three probabilistic models (low and
high ocean resolution, and the joint set).
Probabilistic impacts of climate change.We use 20 estimates of total economic
effects of climate change from the literature reviewed in Table 10.B.1 from Chapter
10 of the IPCCWGII AR5 (ref. 3). These estimates have been calculated using a
variety of methods, but they usually aggregate one by one the economic costs
accruing in different sectors of both global and local impacts. Each study reports
the mean estimates of the economic climate-change damage for a given increase in
global mean temperature. Five of the studies also include a measure of the
uncertainty surrounding these estimates in the form of the standard deviation
(normal distribution) or a confidence interval (skewed distribution). In the case of
the skewed distribution, we estimate the parameters of a displaced Gamma
distribution matching the reported confidence interval and mean. Given the few
data and given that studies only cover temperature increases of up to 4.8 ◦C, we fit
three different probabilistic damage models over the economic climate-change
damage data. Let Id be the economic impacts, expressed in % of GWP, T be the
temperature increase and βj the regression coefficients, then three impact functions
are defined. The first is a quadratic impact function I1(T )=β1T+β2T 2, as
proposed by ref. 38, which has been used in the DICE integrated assessment
model13. This function can allow for positive impacts (benefits) at low
temperatures. The second is an exponential impact function
I2(T )=exp(−β3T 2)−1, as introduced by ref. 39, which excludes the possibility of
positive damage (benefits) and which implies greater losses at high warming levels.
The third is a sextic impact function I3(T )=β4T 2+β5T 6, adapted from ref. 40,
which implies catastrophic outcomes at extreme temperatures. The economic
damage distributions generated by the three models are shown in Supplementary
Fig. 7 as probabilistic functions of the temperature increase.
The procedure to estimate the probabilistic relationship between carbon
budgets and damage costs is similar to that used in generating the probabilistic
mitigation costs models. First, we gather the generated damage costs in five clusters
spanning the range of carbon budgets, and we fit each cluster data with a
log-normal distribution. Second, we estimate, by means of least squares fit, the
relationships between the log-normal distribution parameters and the carbon
budgets (using the central point of each cluster as a reference). However, in the case
of damage, for each of the carbon budgets we have three temperature probabilistic
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models and, associated with each temperature level, three damage functions.
Supplementary Fig. 8 presents the three resulting piecewise probabilistic damage
cost functions, for three illustrative years, using temperature projections based on
the whole CMIP5 data set model.
Economic projection.We use global projections of population and economic
production growth produced by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) for the second Shared Socio-economic Pathway (SSP2;
ref. 41). The SSP2 describes a ‘middle of the road’ socio-economic scenario. Let Y¯t
denote production per capita for each year t ∈T={2010, . . . , 2200}, gross of any
mitigation or damage cost. At each time period t , given each state of the world s,
and each of the mitigation and damage probabilistic modelsm, the overall
economic impacts associated with a carbon budget c is given by the combination of
the mitigation costMt (c; s,m) and the climate-change damage Dt (c; s,m). Both
mitigation and damage are indexed on the combination of modelsm, andm is
defined as a triplet selected within the setΩ= {{mitigation-all, mitigation-BU,
mitigation-TD}× {climate-all, climate-ocean-lo, climate-ocean-hi}×
{{damage-sextic}, {damage-quadratic}, {damage-exponential}}}. The classes
of model are listed in Supplementary Table 1. As both mitigation
and damage losses data are expressed as % of GWP, we can compute
the resulting per capita world production net of mitigation and
damage losses.
Yt (c; s,m)= Y¯t×(1−Mt (c; s,m))×(1−Dt (c; s,m)), ∀t ∈T
Given that outcomes from the data set end in 2100, we assume that post-2100
mitigation costs decrease linearly, starting from their 2100 level and reaching zero
in 2200, and that post-2100 damage costs remain constant at their 2100 level over
the whole twenty-second century. As an illustration, Fig. 2 shows the distributions
of Yt (c; s,m) in 2100, for twelve combinations of models ({{mitigation-BU,
mitigation-TD}× {climate-ocean-lo, climate-ocean-hi}× {damage-sextic,
damage-quadratic, damage-exponential}}) and for two carbon budgets.
Supplementary Fig. 11 provides an intertemporal view of Yt (c; s,m) for three
representative budgets.
Consumption. Not all models included in the data set report the value of global
consumption. This is particularly true for BU energy model. As we want to perform
our calculation using utility, which is generally a function of consumption, we need
to translate GWP into consumption figures. For those models reporting both
consumption and GWP, the ratio of the two measures remains constant across
scenarios and presents a similar time trend, as depicted in Supplementary Fig. 9.
We fit the model mean ratio with a quadratic function and extrapolate it until 2200
(Supplementary Fig. 10). The fitted ratio is 0.741 in 2020, which is consistent with
the 26% world gross saving forecast for the year 2017 by the World Economic
Outlook of the International Monetary Fund, slightly increasing over time (to 0.820
in 2200). This procedure allows us to express mitigation and damage losses in
terms of consumption losses. In particular, to obtain consumption per capita, we
apply the fitted ratio ζt to the world net production per capita at
each time period.
Ct (c; s,m)=ζtYt (c; s,m), ∀t ∈T
Utility function. To translate consumption per capita into utility, we employ the
Epstein–Zin preferences formulation42. This formulation allows one to disentangle
preferences over time, consumption smoothing and risk. The recursive utility
function is
Vt ,ω(c; s,m)=[(1−β)C1−ρt (c; s,m)+β(Et;s,mV 1−αt+1,ω(c; s′,m′))
1−ρ
1−α ] 11−ρ (1)
where Et;s′ ,m′ is a time-dependent expectation operator over states, s, and models,
m∈ω⊆Ω . α and β denote the relative risk aversion and the time preference
parameter, respectively. β=1/(1+δ) and δ is the pure rate of time preference. ρ is
the reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS). In the first period
t0=2010, the equation (1) simplifies to
Vt0 ,ω(c)=[(1−β)C1−ρt0 +β(Es∈S,m∈ωV 1−αt0+1,ω(c; s,m))
1−ρ
1−α ] 11−ρ
where Ct0 denotes world consumption in 2010, which is known and independent of
the carbon budget, c. The expectation operator Et0 =Es∈S,m∈ω is applied over the
future states of the world S and over a subset of models ω. For t> t0, the future state
of the world is certain as well as the selected model, so equation (1) is written as
Vt ,ω(c; s,m)=[(1−β)C1−ρt (c; s,m)+β(V 1−αt+1,ω(c; s,m))
1−ρ
1−α ] 11−ρ , ∀t> t0
Starting from the last period 2200, we compute the utility values recursively every
year until 2010. We are assuming uncertainty resolves in period 2020; however, we
provide a robustness analysis for different learning periods in the Supplementary
Information. We specify a utility value of 0 for t>2,200.
Decision rules.We build up on the so-called ‘classical subjective expected utility’
framework5. This framework allows us to disentangle two sources of uncertainty:
‘model’ uncertainty, and ‘state’ uncertainty. We expand this framework to account
for decision makers (DM) with different attitudes towards ‘model’ and ‘state’
uncertainty. The decision rules are listed in Supplementary Table 2 and
explained hereafter.
Maxmin rule. According to the maxmin criterion, the DM is precautious and
discards any probabilistic information. The DM’s main objective is to avoid
the worst case across both states and models. At each period of time, the DM
considers only the worst world consumption per capita over both the




Ct (c; s,m))1−ρ+βV1−ρt+1 (c)] 11−ρ
Similarly to V , Vt (c)=0 for t>2200. The DM selects the carbon budget which
leads to the highest value for Vt0 (c).
Subjective expected utility. According to the subjective expected utility criterion,
the DM considered ‘model’ and ‘state’ uncertainty as interchangeable and assumes
all models are equally valid (as they do not have information to make any better
judgement). The expectation operator aggregates over states and model
combinations. In this case ω= {{mitigation-all}× {climate-all}× {damage-sextic,
damage-quadratic, damage-exponential}} and
Vt0 (c)=[(1−β)C1−ρt0 +β(Es,mV 1−αt+1 (c; s,m))
1−ρ
1−α ] 11−ρ
This formulation is equivalent to Savage’s subjective expected utility
decision criterion5.
Maxmin expected utility. According to the Maxmin expected utility criterion,
‘model’ and ‘state’ uncertainty should be considered differently. In particular, the
criterion is dogmatic about which of the models to consider and puts all the weight
on the most pessimistic one, whereas for each of the models the expected utility
over states of the world is considered.
First, the utility associated with each possible combination of models
ω=m∈ {{mitigation-BU, mitigation-TD}× {climate-ocean-lo,
climate-ocean-hi}× {damage-sextic, damage-quadratic, damage-exponential}} is
calculated as:
Vt0 ,m(c)=[(1−β)C1−ρt0 +β(EsV 1−αt+1 (c; s,m))
1−ρ
1−α ] 11−ρ
The SEU and Maxmin EU frameworks incorporate, respectively, neutrality and
full aversion to the ambiguity related to the specification of the data-generating
model. The Maxmin EU criterion focuses on model uncertainty and should not be
confused with the Maxmin EU with non-unique prior43 which focuses on states of
the world.
Carbon budget selection.We generate the policy and damage costs for 100,000
stochastic worlds and 15 nontrivial combinations of model choices,
{{{mitigation-BU}, {mitigation-TD}}× {{climate-ocean-lo}, {climate-ocean-hi}}×
{{damage-sextic}, {damage-quadratic}, {damage-exponential}}} +
{{mitigation-all}× {climate-all}× {{damage-sextic}, {damage-quadratic},
{damage-exponential}}}, for 2,500 carbon budgets within the range 500–6,000
GtCO2. Criteria are computed for different δ, α and ρ. Carbon budgets are selected
at the maximum of a function, fitting the generated data by a local polynomial
regression. We repeat these steps 5,000 times and estimate the error made in the
carbon budget selection. The main results, including the estimated standard errors,
are shown in Supplementary Tables 3 and 5.
Parameter specification. δ represents the pure rate of time preference. We use
three values: 0.1%, 1% and 3%, which cover the spectrum of values used in climate
policy analysis44,45. The default value for EIS is 3/2, with sensitivity to 1/2 and 5/2,
as elicited in the literature46,47. We allow α to range from 1 to 20. Bansal and Yaron47
suggest a value of around 10.
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